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Abstract 
 
In the U.S., Germany, and several other countries, either 
corporate or bankruptcy law allows courts to subordinate loans by 
controlling shareholders or to treat the loans as equity. In Japan, 
although many scholars support introducing subordination into 
Japanese law, no legislation has been enacted. In addition, some 
courts have recently declined to employ subordination and regarded 
shareholder loans as one of the ordinal economic activities. Should we 
introduce subordination in Japan? 
This paper discusses the function of subordination in terms of 
creditor protection through comparative law (American law and 
German law) and argues that there is no need to use it actively in 
Japan. The existing rules are sufficient to protect general creditors, 
without subordination. Indeed, the thoughtless introduction of 
subordination might hinder the implementation of efficient financing 
and completion of projects in closely-held companies or corporate 
groups. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Subordination of shareholder loans has been used in the U.S., Germany, and 
several other countries.1 In these countries, either corporate or bankruptcy law 
allows courts to subordinate loans by controlling shareholders or to treat the loans 
as equity. Therefore, subordination has played a significant role in creditor 
protection because general creditors can receive more payments in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
In Japan, subordination is a controversial issue. Subordination has been 
adopted in several cases where plaintiffs claimed shareholder liability. Many 
scholars also support introducing subordination into Japanese law, referring to the 
U.S. and Germany. However, subordination has not been enacted in legislation in 
Japan yet. 2  Recently, some courts have declined to employ subordination and 
regarded shareholder loans as one of the ordinal economic activities. Should we 
introduce subordination in Japan? If we employ subordination according to foreign 
law, it might hinder the implementation of efficient financing and completion of 
projects, as shareholder loans are important financing tools in closely-held 
companies or corporate groups. 
This paper discusses the function of subordination in terms of creditor 
protection through comparative law (American law and German law) and argues 
that there is no need to use subordination actively in Japan. Although previous 
studies in Japan mainly focus on the conditions or range of subordination, they 
have never revealed how subordination serves creditor protection compared to the 
other rules. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part II provides previous cases 
involving subordination of shareholder loans in Japan, which show that the courts 
have indefinite views on subordination. Then, after an overview of previous studies 
in Part III, Part IV briefly reviews subordination in the U.S. and Germany. Based 
on comparative law, Part V considers reasons that may justify subordination and 
why Japan may benefit from it, but this paper argues that the existing rules are 
sufficient to protect general creditors, without subordination. Finally, Part VI 
concludes.  
 
                                                   
1 Examples include Austria, Italy, and Spain. See Martin Gelter & Jürg Roth, Subordination of 
Shareholder Loans from A Legal and Economic Perspective, 5 J. INST. COMP. 40, 40 (2007). 
2  Experts have twice discussed whether to legislate subordination of shareholder loans. 
Hōmushō Minzikyoku Sanzikanshitsu, Shōhō & Yugenkaishahō Kaiseishian [A Draft for the 
Reform of Commercial Code and Limited Companies Act], 89 BESSATSU SHŌJI HŌMU 125(1986) 
and Hōmushō Minzikyoku Sanzikanshitsu, Tōsanhōsei ni kansuru Kaiseikentōkadai [Agendas 
on the Reform of Bankruptcy Law], 46 BESSATSU NBL 1 (1999).  
 3 
 
2 Previous Cases in Japan 
 
2.1 The legal basis for subordination of shareholder loans 
 
As mentioned above, there is no particular rule for subordination of shareholder 
loans in Japan. If someone makes a claim for subordination before a judge, the 
claimant needs to employ general rules for the modification of bankruptcy claims. 
Through the interpretation of general rules, some courts have subordinated 
shareholder loans to other claims. 
For example, Art. 155 (1) Minji saiseihō [Civil Rehabilitation Act] provides as 
follows:  
 
The content of any modification of rights based on a rehabilitation plan shall be 
equal between rehabilitation creditors; provided, however, that this shall not 
apply where any rehabilitation creditor who will suffer detriment has given 
consent or where equity will not be undermined even if the plan otherwise 
provides for a small rehabilitation claim or any of the claims listed in Article 84 
(2) or any other difference in treatment of rehabilitation creditors.3  
 
Kaisha kōseihō [Corporate Reorganization Act] also has a similar rule.4 In 
Hasanhō [Bankruptcy Act], there is no similar rule. As a result, parties must refer 
to the fundamental principles given in Art. 1(2) Minpō [Civil Code]. It provides as 
follows: 
 
The exercise of rights and performance of duties must be done in good faith .  
 
These rules have no specific conditions for subordination and only contain 
words such as “equity” and “good faith,” which are abstract principles. Thus, 
Japanese courts must determine whether to subordinate shareholder loans based 
on such abstract principles. This inevitably makes the function of subordination 
                                                   
3 The translations of Japanese law referred in this paper are from the website “Japanese Law 
Translation,” which is managed by the Ministry of Justice. Available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/  
4 Art. 168(1) Corporate Reorganization Act provides as follows: 
 
The content of a reorganization plan concerning the persons holding the following types of 
rights shall be equal between such persons who hold the same type of rights; provided, 
however, that this shall not apply where any person who will suffer detriment has given 
consent or where equity will not be undermined even if the plan otherwise provides for a 
small reorganization claim, etc. or any of the claims listed in Article 136, paragraph (2), 
item (i) to item (iii) or where equity will not be undermined even if any other difference is 
set in treatment of the persons who hold the same type of rights.  
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unclear while allowing courts some degree of discretion to employ it.  
 
2.2 Previous Judgments 
 
There are seven Japanese cases in which subordination of shareholder loans was 
discussed. As seen in Table 1, Japanese courts have no established doctrinal basis 
for subordination and instead relied on other various reasons to subordinate such 
loans.  
Among the judgments in which shareholder loans were subordinated, case 25 
and case 56 listed not only “control by shareholder,” but also that the “shareholders’ 
conduct triggers bankruptcy of the company” or “shareholders’ realization of their 
company in insolvency.” In contrast, Case 1 7  referred to “family company,” 
“insolvency (overindebtedness),” and “mismanagement” without mentioning the 
reasons provided in cases 2 and 5. The relationship between these reasons is 
unclear, and these courts did not even explain why subordination is necessary 
based on these reasons. 
Conversely, courts refusing to subordinate shareholder loans seem to, at the 
outset, have a negative attitude towards subordination. Case 48 explained that 
“there are no particular rules on subordination” and “lack of discussion on 
subordination”. In addition, recent judgments (case 6 9  and case 7 10 ) regarded 
shareholder loans as “one of the ordinal economic activities.” In contrast to case 1, 
case 3 11  contended that “mere mismanagement is an insufficient reason to 
subordinate shareholder loans”.  
In sum, subordination is dependent upon the courts’ discretion, and courts 
have opposing views on it. Moreover, even when subordination is used, the 
necessity for it is ambiguous based on the various factors considered and discussed 
by the courts. This situation differs greatly from German law, in which the 
conditions for subordination are clearly prescribed by legislation. Rather, it is 
similar to American law, which leaves the discretion to subordinate shareholder 
loans to courts, although the law of subordination is formally provided in the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
 
                                                   
5 Fukuoka Kōtō Saibansho [Fukuoka High Ct.] Dec. 21, 1981, 1046 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 127. 
6  Hiroshima Chihō Saibansho Fukuyama Branch [Hiroshima Dist. Ct.] Mar. 6, 1998, 1660 
HANJI 112.  
7 Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Feb. 11, 1965, 16 KAKYŪ SAIBANSHO HANREISHŪ 
[SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 240.  
8 Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1991, 903 KIN’YŪ SHŌJI HANREI [KINYŪ 
HANREI] 39.  
9 Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] June 30, 2010, 1372 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 228. 
10 Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] July 4, 2011, 1372 HANTA 228. 
11 Nagoya Kōtō Saibansho Kanazawa Branch [Nagoya High Ct.] Sep. 1984, 537 HANTA 237. 
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Table 1 List of the Cases 
Case Date Type* Judge** Reason*** 
1 2.11.1965 C Yes 
family company, 
insolvency (overindebtedness),  
mismanagement 
2 12.21.1981 C Yes 
control by shareholder, 
shareholders’ conduct triggers bankruptcy of the  
company  
3 9.1.1984 C No 
mere mismanagement is an insufficient reason to 
subordinate shareholder loans  
4 12.16.1991 B No 
there are no particular rules on subordination, 
lack of discussion on subordination  
5 3.6.1998 B Yes 
control by shareholder, 
shareholders’ realization of the companies 
in insolvency 
6 6.30.2010 R No 
other creditor ’s understanding of shareholder 
loans,  
shareholder loans are one of the ordinal economic 
activities 
7 7.4.2011 R No 
shareholder loans are one of the ordinal economic 
activities 
* Type stands for the kind of bankruptcy proceedings (“C”=corporate reorganization proceeding, 
“B”=bankruptcy proceeding, and “R”=civil rehabilitation proceeding).  
** Judge means whether the court subordinated shareholder loans (“Yes”=subordinated 
shareholder loan or “No”=did not subordinate shareholder loan).  
*** Reason is the grounds mentioned in the judgment.  
 
3 An Overview of Previous Studies in Japan 
 
This section reviews a large number of previous studies on subordination of 
shareholder loans in Japan, most of which refer to the rules of subordination in the 
U.S. or Germany and suggest the introduction of these rules into Japanese law. 
They can be divided into two legal fields: corporate law and bankruptcy law. Each 
field has different viewpoints on subordination, and thus this section analyzes 
them separately.  
 
3.1 Bankruptcy Law 
 
As seen in Table 2, a lot of the literature in bankruptcy law has examined 
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subordination of shareholder loans from the principle of “equality of creditors”. 
Other studies with unclear viewpoints seem to naturally rely on that principle 
when employing subordination. These studies considered a situation where 
shareholders with loans to the companies are allowed to receive payments as 
general creditors in bankruptcy proceedings while also benefitting from the success 
of the business, and found that this situation contradicts the “equality of creditors.” 
As a result, these studies simply listed the conditions of subordination, but did not 
explain what problems shareholder loans cause to other general creditors and how 
subordination resolves those problems.  
Ito (1984)12 mentioned four conditions for subordination: “a breach of the 
duty of loyalty,” “undercapitalization,” “bankrupt company’s loss triggered by 
shareholders,” and “parent company’s benefit at subsidiary’s cost.” Hata (1996),13 
and Nakajima (2015) 14  also identified “exploitation.” The definition of 
“exploitation” differs slightly depending on the author and, for example, is 
commonly used in the sense of unreasonable consideration in transactions and 
excessive dividends from companies to controlling shareholders. In addition, 
Kurabe (2007)15 and Kawanaka (2013)16 mentioned “recharacterization,” which 
regards shareholder loans as equity in bankruptcy proceedings without requiring 
“inequitable conduct” on the part of shareholders and has recently been used in 
American courts. Other studies listed conditions such as “instrumentality,” “risk of 
business failure,” “capital-like loans,” “dominant bargaining power,” 
“mismanagement,” and “elimination of unfairness” (Okuyama (1969),17 Takahashi 
                                                   
12 MAKOTO ITO, SAIMUSHA KŌSEI TETSUDUKI NO KENKYŪ [STUDY ON BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS] 
299-301 (1984).  
13 Hiroki Hata, Tōsan Saiken no Retsugoteki Shogū ni tsuite (1) [Subordination of Debt Claims 
in Bankruptcy (1)], 40-2 JYŌCHI HŌGAKU RONSHŪ 139, 150 (1996).  
14  Masaki Nakajima, Naibusha Saiken no Retsugoka [Subordination of Insider Claims], in 
KAISHAHŌ / TŌSANHŌ NO GENDAITEKI TENKAI [DEVELOPMENT OF COMPANY LAW AND BANKRUPTCY 
LAW] (Mitsumasa Tanabe et al., ed., 2014) 455. 
15 Mayumi Kurabe, Tōsan Tetsuduki ni okeru Saiken no Retsugoka ni tsuite [Subordination of 
Claims in Bankruptcy Proceedings], 318 DŌSHISHA HŌGAKU 2191, 2205 (2007). 
16 Hiroyoshi Kawanaka, Hasan Tetsuduki ni okeru Saiken no Retsugoka no Ichisokumen [An 
Aspect of Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy Proceedings], 46-3 HIKAKU HŌGAKU 1, 32-4 
(2013).  
17 Tsuneo Okuyama, Iwayuru Hōjinkaku Hinin no Hōri to Jissai [Piercing the Corporate Veil 
in Practice], in JITSUMU MINJI SOSHŌ KŌZA DAIGOKAN [LECTURES OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
VOL. 5] (Tyūichi Suzuki & Akira Mikaduki ed., 1969) 175.   
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(1997), 18  Kashiwagi (2001), 19  Masuichi (2002), 20  Mukaiyama (2008), 21  and 
Kojima (2012)22). 
In contrast, a few studies analyzed subordination from the perspective of 
creditor protection. Uehara (1988) 23  introduced the discussion on “equity 
substitution law (Eigenkapitalersatzrecht)” in Germany, which subordinated 
shareholder loans made during a company’s crisis to other general claims.24 He 
found two reasons for subordination in this circumstance: “the creation of the 
ability to pay in appearance” and “risk shifting to other general creditors.” 
Matsushita (1990)25 researched studies and cases on subordination in the U.S. in 
depth and suggested using subordination for “undercapitalization.” He insisted 
that the risk arising from undercapitalization should be redistributed to 
shareholders with subordination. 
 
Table 2 List of Previous Studies in Bankruptcy Law 
Author Perspective  Referenced Country / Reason 
Okuyama 
(1969) 
equality of creditors －  / instrumentality, risk of business 
failure 
Ito (1984) equality of creditors the U.S. / four reasons including a breach 
of the duty of loyalty, etc. 
Uehara (1988) creditor protection Germany / the creation of the ability to pay 
in appearance, risk shifting to other 
general creditors 
Matsushita 
(1990) 
creditor protection  the U.S. / undercapitalization 
Hata (1996) the need for subordination the U.S. & Germany / a number of reasons 
                                                   
18 Hiroshi Takahashi, Saikensha no Byōdō to Kōhei [Equality and Fairness of Creditors], 1111 
JURISUTO 159 (1997).  
19 Noboru Kashiwagi, Saimusha to Keiei Shihai suru Kabunushi de ha nai Saikensha no Saiken 
to Kōheihōjyō no Retsugoka [A debtor, creditor’s (not being shareholder) claim and equitable 
subordination], IN MINJI SOSHŌHŌ RIRON NO ARATANA KŌTIKU GEKAN [THE CONSTRUCTION ON 
THE THEORY OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE VOL.2] (Yoshimitsu Aoyama et al., ed., 2011) 476. 
20  Toru Masuichi, Naibusha ni Kansuru Hinin no Tokusoku oyobi Naibusha Saiken no 
Retsugoka [Avoidance and Subordination of Insider Claims], 69 BESSATSU NBL 17 (2002).  
21 Junko Mukaiyama, Tōsanhō ni okeru Naibushatō no Saiken no Retsugoteki Toriatsukai ni 
tsuite (2/final) [Subordination of Insider Claims in Bankruptcy Law (2/final)] , 127 WASEDA 
DAIGAKU DAIGAKUIN HŌKEN RONSHŪ 173, 186 (2008).  
22 Nobuo Kojima, Tōsan Saiken (Naibusha Saiken) no Retsugoka [Subordination of Bankruptcy 
Claims (Insider claims)], in TŌSANHŌ KAISEI TENBŌ [PROSPECTS OF THE CHANGE IN BANKRUPTCY 
LAW] (Tokyo Bengoshikai Tōsanhōbu ed., 2012) 478-79.  
23 Toshio Uehara, Kaisha no Tōsan to Naibu Saiken no Retsugoteki Shogū (Tyū) [Bankruptcy 
and subordination of insider claims the second volume of the three],  1280 HANJI 5-6 (1988).  
24 Dirk A. Verse, Shareholder Loans in Corporate Insolvency – A New Approach to an Old 
Problem, 9 GERMAN L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2008).  
25 Junich Matsushita, Ketsugō Kigyō no Tōusanhōteki Kiritsu (1) [Studies in Insolvency Law 
of Corporate Groups(1)] 107 Hōgaku Kyōkai Zasshi 1761, 1793 (1990)．  
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in Japan including undercapitalization, etc. 
Takahashi 
(1997) 
equality of creditors － / undercapitalization, exploitation 
Kashiwagi 
(2001) 
－ the U.S. / a number of reasons including 
undercapitalization, etc. 
Masuichi 
(2002) 
－ － / capital-like loan, dominant bargaining 
position 
Kurabe (2007) equality of creditors the U.S. / a number of reasons including 
recharacterization, etc. 
Mukaiyama 
(2008) 
the need for subordination 
in Japan 
the U.S. / undercapitalization, 
mismanagement 
Kojima (2012) equality of creditors － / elimination of unfairness  
Kawanaka 
(2013) 
－ the U.S. / recharacterization 
Nakajima 
(2015) 
equality of creditors － / undercapitalization, exploitation 
 
3.2 Corporate Law 
 
As shown in Table 3, most studies in corporate law have viewed subordination in 
terms of limited liability or creditor protection. They considered subordination of 
shareholder loans as an exception to the limited liability principle that a firm’s 
creditors have no claim against its shareholders’ assets. Thus, the central concern 
in this research was how to protect creditors against some problems under the 
limited liability system, and some of these studies were primarily interested in 
“piercing the corporate veil” or “undercapitalization” rather than subordination 
itself. Unfortunately, in their analyses, these studies (except for Goto (2007)26) 
simply listed the conditions for subordination under American and/or German law 
like the studies in bankruptcy law do.  
Sudo (1964) 27  mentioned three conditions for subordination: 
“undercapitalization,” “exploitation,” and “a breach of fiduciary duty by parent 
company.” Either “undercapitalization” or “exploitation” were cited frequently in 
                                                   
26 GEN GOTO, KABUNUSHI YŪGEN SEKININ SEIDO NO HEIGAI TO KASHŌSHIHON NI YORU KABUNUSHI 
NO SEKININ [DEMERITS OF LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE SHAREHOLDER 'S LIABILITY FOR 
UNDERCAPITALIZATION] 143 (2007). 
27 Shigeru Sudo, Kogaisha no Hasan to Oyagaisha Saiken (1) [Subsidiary’s Bankruptcy and 
Parent Company’s Claim (1)], 4 - 3 KOKUGAKUIN HŌGAKU 45, 61-62 (1967).  
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other studies (Egashira (1980), 28  Katagi (1982), 29  and Sakurazawa (2008) 30 ). 
According to Egashira (1980), limited liability is based on the assumption that 
companies hold and maintain a certain amount of capital. Accordingly, 
shareholders cannot enjoy limited liability where there is “undercapitalization” or 
“exploitation.” Katagi (1982) and Matsuyama (1985) 31  also pointed out “the 
creation of the ability to pay in appearance.” This reason, which was also 
mentioned in the bankruptcy law studies, means that shareholder loans mislead 
potential creditors into providing a loan to debtor companies because the creditors 
misunderstand the debtors’ creditworthiness. In addition, Shinoda (1984)32 listed 
“risk shifting to other general creditors,” and Saito (2001)33 identified “fraudulent 
conveyance.”  
In contrast to these studies, Goto (2007) began discussing a different 
perspective that focuses on the distortion of shareholders’ incentives to take on 
riskier projects or to externalize the tort cost when companies are in financial 
distress, which will be hereafter referred to as “excessive risk taking.” 
Subordination was discussed in a small part of his book, in which he argued that 
subordination can eliminate the distortion of shareholders’ incentives because it 
regards shareholder loans as equity and subordination can internalize the cost 
resulting from excessive risk taking. Yet, he also suggested that subordination may 
be used for other purposes in the U.S. Takeda (2007)34 also referenced “excessive 
risk taking.”  
 
Table 3 List of Previous Studies in Corporate Law 
Author Perspective  Referenced country / Reason 
Sudo (1964) equality of creditors the U.S. / a number of reasons including 
undercapitalization, etc. 
Egashira 
(1980) 
limited liability the U.S. & Germany / undercapitalization, 
mismanagement 
                                                   
28 KENJIRO EGASHIRA, KAISHA HŌUJINKAKU HININ NO HŌRI [PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL], 310, 
313 - 14 (1980). 
29  Haruhiko Katagi, Kashōshihon Gaisha to sono Kisei [Regulation of Company with 
Undercapitalization], 111 - 2 HŌGAKU RONSŌ 5, 48 (1982).  
30  Takaya Sakurazawa, Kaisha Tōsanji ni okeru Shihai Kabunushi no Kaishasaikensha ni 
taisuru Sekinin [The Controlling Shareholder's Liabilities to the Creditors When a Corporation 
is in Bankruptcy], 125 WASEDA DAIGAKU DAIGAKUIN HŌKEN RONSHŪ 131, 146 (2008).  
31 Miwako Matsuyama, Shōkibo Kaisha ni okeru Shihon no Kakuho to Shihai Kabunushi no 
Sekinin [Maintenance of Equity and Controlling Shareholder’s Liability in a Small Company], 
13 KITAMI DAIGAKU RONSHŪ 33, 37 (1985).  
32 Shiro Shinoda, Kashō Shihon ni okeru Shain no Sekinin (3/Kan) [Shareholder’s liability for 
Undercapitalization (3/final)], 39 - 3 MEIJO HŌGAKU 1, 30 (1990).   
33 Maki Saito, Kogaisha no Kanri to Oyagaisha no Sekinin (1) [Liability of Holding Company 
for the Debts of its Subsidiaries (1)], 149 - 1 HOGAKU RONSŌ 1, 33 (2001).  
34 Norihiro Takeda, Doitsu Yūgen Kaishahō ni okeru Shain Kashitukehō no Kaisei [The change 
of shareholder loans law in GmbHG], 41 - 3 HIKAKUHŌ ZASSHI 181, 216 (2007).  
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Katagi (1982) creditor protection the U.S. & Germany / a number of reasons 
including undercapitalization, etc. 
Shinoda 
(1984) 
the need for subordination 
in Japan 
Germany / risk shifting to other general 
creditors 
Matsuyama 
(1985) 
creditor protection Germany / the creation of the ability to pay 
in appearance  
Saito (2001) creditor protection the U.S. & Germany / fraudulent 
conveyance 
Goto (2007) limited liability the U.S. / a number of possible reasons 
including excessive risk taking, etc. 
Takeda (2007) － Germany / excessive risk taking 
Sakurazawa 
(2008) 
limited liability the U.S. / a number of reasons including 
mismanagement, etc. 
 
3.3 Two Open Questions from Previous Studies 
 
Two questions remain from the previous studies. First, it is difficult to understand 
the function of subordination, as a variety of reasons are simply listed together. 
While the previous studies mention many reasons that might justify subordination, 
they do not show how shareholder loans and their subordination work. For example, 
“undercapitalization” and “the creation of the ability to pay in appearance,” which 
are frequently mentioned in the studies, are different situations. The former 
represents a situation when equity is small, and the latter concerns other creditors’ 
trust in the company’s ability to pay.  
Second, subordination should not be discussed from a moral perspective. 
More particularly, “equality of creditors,” which is often emphasized in the 
literature, may be an important factor in bankruptcy proceedings, but corporate 
law in Japan has no rule that shareholders must provide additional equity to the 
company instead of lending loans and allows them to become creditors at any time. 
After all, the literature on the “equality of creditors” only mentions situations (such 
as “undercapitalization,” “mismanagement,” and “exploitation,” etc.) in which it is 
easy to blame shareholders from a moral perspective. Such an approach hinders 
the understanding of how subordination functions.  
 
4 Subordination in the U.S. and Germany 
  
This section discusses subordination of shareholder loans in the U.S. and Germany, 
which substantially impacted the previous studies in Japan.  
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4.1 The U.S. 
 
4.1.1 The outline of subordination 
 
In the U.S., subordination of shareholder loans originated in the case law, until it 
was enacted in § 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.35 However, this law 
outlines no particular conditions for subordination and references only “under 
principles of equitable subordination,” and the discretion to use it remains with 
the courts.36  
 
4.1.2 Case law 
 
American courts use subordination for a variety of purposes and do not provide a 
theoretical basis to justify it. In Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co.37 and Pepper 
v. Litton,38 the two leading judges of the Supreme Court did not explain why 
subordination was necessary in either case. Some Japanese studies understood 
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. as an “undercapitalization” case 39  or 
“exploitation” case.40 Furthermore, some doubted if there was any need to use 
subordination in Pepper v. Litton, because the existence of shareholder claims was 
suspicious in that case.41 Looking at subsequent cases, subordination was used for 
a number of reasons (“capital contributions,”42 “the potential injustice to other 
creditors,”43 “the unconscionable use of the opportunity afforded by the domination 
to advantage itself at the injury of the subsidiary,”44 and “fraudulent or otherwise 
inequitable,”45 etc.). 
                                                   
35 Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows: 
 
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, the 
court may—  
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of 
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or 
part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or   
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate.  
36  Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Beyond the Limits of Equity Jurisprudence: No-Fault Equitable 
Subordination, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1491 (1982). 
37 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). 
38 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
39 Egashira, supra note 28, at 310. 
40 Goto, supra note 26, at 191. 
41 Matsushita, supra note 25, at 1783 and Goto, supra note 26, at 193. 
42 Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F. 2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941).  
43 Flynn v. Loewer Realty Co. (In re Loewer’s Gambrinus Brewery Co.) , 167 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 
1948). 
44 Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1948). 
45 Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958). 
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Then, although Benjamin v. Diamond,46 which is still frequently cited in 
other cases 47  and studies, mentioned “inequitable conduct,” the context was 
ambiguous because it included many circumstances such as “initial 
undercapitalization,” “mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, and abuse of 
fiduciary position,” and “other inequitable conduct.” 48  As Landers (1975) has 
pointed out, American courts seem to take an ad hoc approach to subordination.49 
Some studies in Japan appear to reflect the attitude of American courts. 
In recent years, American courts have deployed “recharacterization” in 
addition to subordination. 50  This concept, unlike subordination, does not 
necessarily require “inequitable conduct” on the part of shareholders.51 
 
4.1.3 Literature 
 
The literature published before the 1970s attempted to classify cases where 
shareholder loans were subordinated and to identify the conditions for 
subordination. Herzog and Zweibel (1961) mentioned the following six conditions: 
“consensual subordination,” “capital contribution,” “fraud by the claimant,” 
“illegality in the origin or enforcement of the claim,” “equitable considerations,” 
and “instrumentality.” 52  Gleick (1961) also pointed out the following six 
situations: “consensual subordination to all creditors or part of them,” “fraudulent 
conduct or a breach of fiduciary duty,” “instrumentality,” “undercapitalization,” 
“joint ventures,” and “claims as a result of illegal schemes or conduct.”53 While 
these attempts may be useful for predicting subordination, they do not clarify the 
function of subordination. 
On the other hand, the literature published after the 1970s focused on the 
function of subordination. They can be divided into three perspectives. The first 
perspective is that loans from a parent company to a subsidiary should be always 
subordinated because the loans are unlikely to maximize the benefits of the 
                                                   
46 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977). 
47 See e.g., In re Fabricators, Inc., 926 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1991), In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 
132 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 1997), and SI Restructuring, Inc. v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, 
Inc.), 532 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008). 
48 Andrea DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to 
Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW. 417, 422 (1985). 
49 Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach To Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in 
Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 597-598 (1975). 
50 Hilary A. Goehausen, You Said You Were Going to Do What to My Loan?, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COMM. L. J. 117, 118 (2005). 
51 DANIEL J. BUSSEL & DAVID A. SKEEL, BANKRUPTCY 384 (2015). 
52 Asa S. Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 85 (1961). 
53 Harry S. Gleick, Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy under the Equitable Power of the 
Bankruptcy Court, 16 BUS. LAW. 611, 612 (1961). 
 13 
 
subsidiary.54 Although the second perspective opposes such an opinion, it argues 
that shareholder loans should be subordinated when the other general creditors 
misunderstand that the loans by a parent company are included in the subsidiary’s 
assets.55 The third view, which is the most widely accepted in recent studies,56 
views subordination as a way to supplement fraudulent conveyance law (a simple 
remedy against exploitation). 57  However, this view also understands that 
subordination is likely to be used in undercapitalization cases 
(undercapitalization).58 
 
4.2 Germany  
  
4.2.1 The outline of subordination 
 
In Germany, shareholder loans have been regulated by both case law and statutory 
law (§ 32a and § 32b GmbHG [the Limited Liability Companies Act]) legislated 
in 1980. 59  Under both, which were called “equity substitution law 
(Eigenkapitalersatzrecht)”, shareholder loans made or left during a company’s 
crisis had to be subordinated, and the repayment of those loans also had to be 
canceled (except for the loans by shareholders with less than 10 percent equity).60 
A company’s crisis means “overindebtedness,” “inability to pay debt,” and “a third 
party would not have given a loan to debtor companies.”61 In contrast to American 
law, German law did not require “inequitable conduct” on the part of shareholders. 
Also, the case law treated rental properties from shareholders to the company in 
financial distress as equity substitution. As a result, shareholders had no right to 
charge rent to the company or to segregate the rental properties from it.62  
                                                   
54 Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in 
Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 640 (1975). 
55 Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 
523 (1975). 
56  David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable 
Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 200 (2003), and Adam Feibelman, Equitable 
Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 176 
(2007). 
57 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 63 (Aspen, 1986). 
58 For more detail on literature and cases involving shareholder loans in the U.S., see Tomoki 
Masuda, Kabunushi Saiken no Retugotekitoriatsukai no Kinou ni tuite [A Function of the 
Subordination of Shareholder Loans], 372 DŌSHISHA HŌGAKU 1523 (2015). 
59  Horst Eidenmüller, Gesslschafterdarlehen in der Insolvenz, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR CLAUS-
WILHELM CANARIS ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG, BAND II 51 (2007). 
60 Id. at 51. 
61 Verse, supra note 24, at 1112. 
62 Ulrich Huber & Mathias Habersack, Gmbh-Reform: Zwölf Thesen zu einer möglichen Reform 
des Rechts der kapitalerserzenden Gesellschafterdarlehen, Betriebs-Berater [BB] 1, 1 (2006).  
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In 2008, the regulation of shareholder loans was significantly revised (§ 39（1） 
para 5 Insolvenzordnung) in order to simplify the old law. Consequently, “equity 
substitution law” was abolished, and now shareholder loans are automatically 
subordinated whether they are made or left during a company’s crisis (automatic 
subordination). “Automatic subordination” is based on the perspective that 
shareholder loans are questionable financing. According to this perspective, if 
shareholders choose to make a loan to the company, instead of providing a capital 
contribution, they are assumed to abuse their rights as shareholders.63 
 
4.2.2 Case law  
 
Historically, German courts emphasized that shareholders should take 
responsibility for deciding to provide a loan to the company during a financial crisis 
instead of providing a capital contribution.64 Such responsibility was called “the 
responsibility for a consequence of financing decisions 
(Finanzierungsfolgenverantwortung).” German courts have repeatedly highlighted 
that a main problem is how to deal with “a continuation of the business in 
insolvency by shareholder loans” (the continuation of the business in insolvency). 
The regulation of rental properties from shareholders to the company is also 
justified by this perspective.65  
However, after 2008, German courts formally apply the revised law 
(automatic subordination) to shareholder loans.66 Therefore, it is not necessary to 
prove that shareholder loans are “equity substitution.”  
 
4.2.3 Literature 
 
The literature strongly criticized “the responsibility for a consequence of financing 
decisions” mentioned in German courts because it provides no reason why 
shareholders should bear that responsibility. If such responsibility is based on 
shareholders’ duty against creditors, monetary liability should be used instead of 
subordination. 67  Moreover, such responsibility would obligate shareholders to 
                                                   
63  Markus Gehrlein, Das Eigenkapitalersatzrecht im Wandel seiner gesetzlichen 
Kodifikationen BB3, 3 (2011). 
64 Bundesgerichtshof[BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 27, 1976, 67 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN[BGHZ] 171 and BGH Nov. 7, 1994, 127 BGHZ 336.  
65 BGH Oct. 16, 1989, 109 BGHZ 55. 
66 BGH Apr. 30, 2015, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT[ZIP] 1130 (2015) and BGH June 29, 
2015, 204 BGHZ 83. 
67  Andreas Cahn, Gesellschafterfremdfinanzierung und Eigenkapitalersatz, DIE 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT[AG] 217, 218 (2005). 
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provide additional capital.68 
Although many studies have attempted to explain the need for subordination, 
they have failed to do it. A classic account, referenced in Japanese studies, insisted 
that shareholder loans mislead potential creditors into providing loans to debtors 
who appear to have the ability to pay (the creation of the ability to pay in 
appearance). As a result, it was argued that shareholder loans should be 
subordinated for this reason.69  
Furthermore, Gelter (2006) discussed how to control shareholders’ incentive 
to take on excessive risk with subordination (excessive risk taking). 70  He 
suggested subordination is used as a penalty for inefficient rescue attempts which 
the ex-ante expected total value of the company is less than its liquidation value 
at that time, and pointed out that implementing other more severe methods (ex. 
fiduciary duties of directors towards creditors) are better than subordination in 
terms of deterring inefficient rescue attempts.71 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
The reasons for subordination of shareholder loans differ greatly between the U.S. 
and Germany. American courts mentioned a variety of reasons such as 
“undercapitalization,” “exploitation,” and “inequitable conduct.” In particular, the 
widely accepted view highlighted the use of subordination for “exploitation” in 
practice, while pointing out that subordination was sometimes employed in the 
case of “undercapitalization.”  
By contrast, German courts did not require “inequitable conduct” by 
shareholders, but rather based subordination on “a continuation of the business in 
insolvency by shareholder loans” prior to 2008. The classic view understood 
subordination as the remedy against “the creation of the ability to pay in 
appearance.” Now, German law provides that shareholder loans should be 
                                                   
68 Huber & Habersack, supra note 62, at 1. 
69 Marcus Lutter & Peter Kommelhoff, Nachrangiges Haftkapital und Unterkapitalisierung in 
der GmbH, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT[ZGR]31, 36 (1979). 
70 Martin Gelter, The subordination of shareholder loans in bankruptcy, 26 INT. REV. L. ECON. 
478, 479 (2006). 
71  There are additional perspectives. The first perspective argues that limited liability 
transfers the risk of loss to creditors and that shareholders with loans to the company have a 
more advantageous position compared with other creditors. Accordingly, shareholder loans 
should be treated as equity capital first (Ulrich Huber, Gesellschafterdarlehen im GmbH- und 
Insolvenzrecht nach der MoMiG-Reform, IN LIBER AMICORUM FÜR MARTIN WINTER (2011) 265).  
The second perspective is that shareholders are more well-informed about the company than 
other creditors and that shareholder loans should be subordinated to other creditors  (Ulrich 
Ehricke, §39, IN MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR INSOLVENZORDNUNG (Kirchhof & Eidenmüller & 
Stürner ed., 2013), margin number 57).  
For more detail on literature and cases involving shareholder loans in Germany, See Tomoki 
Masuda, Doitsu ni okeru Shainkashituke ni taisuru Kiritsuduke [The regulation of shareholder 
loans in Germany] 383 DŌSHISHA HŌGAKU 623 (2016). 
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automatically subordinated in order to simplify the former law, but it is unclear 
why shareholder loans should always be subordinated.  
 
5 The function and need for subordination in Japan 
  
This section considers the individual reasons for subordination of shareholder 
loans found through comparative law and the need for subordination in Japan. 
This paper has found the following major reasons for subordination: “the creation 
of the ability to pay in appearance” (Germany), “the continuation of the business 
in insolvency” (Germany), “undercapitalization” (the U.S.), “a simple remedy 
against exploitation” (the U.S.), “excessive risk taking” (Germany), and “automatic 
subordination” (Germany). Furthermore, this paper considers subordination for 
“involuntary (tort) creditors,” although the previous studies on subordination 
rarely discussed it.  
In addition to these reasons, some studies in Japan and some cases in the U.S. 
pointed out “a breach of fiduciary duty,” “inequitable conduct,” “instrumentality,” 
and “recharacterization,” but this paper does not discuss them. This is because “a 
breach of fiduciary duty” reflects only basic norms and does not reflect creditors’ 
interests in being protected. “Inequitable conduct” and “instrumentality” are 
ambiguous and include a variety of concepts. 72  Moreover, “recharacterization” 
addresses a different problem from subordination, and “the focus of the 
recharacterization inquiry is whether a debt actually exists.”73  
 
5.1 The creation of the ability to pay in appearance 
 
Should subordination of shareholder loans be used for the creation of the ability to 
pay in appearance? In other words, do shareholder loans mislead potential 
creditors into providing a loan to debtor companies that are overestimated in their 
ability to pay?  
 This reason cannot justify subordination. First, because the total amount of 
debt, not equity, increases the liabilities of balance sheets when shareholders make 
a loan to the company, creditors will not estimate the company to become improved 
in its ability to pay (not to improve equity ratio). 
Second, even if creditors estimate the solvency of a debtor based only on cash 
flow, this reason is unjustified because the change in cash flow will occur even if a 
loan is made by other creditors, such as a bank. Accordingly, if shareholder loans 
                                                   
72 Egashira, supra note 28, at 303. 
73 In re SubMicron Systems Corp., 432 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2006). See Andrea Dardano et al., 
Recharacterization of Debt to Equity under U.S. Law and Its Effects on Corporate Governance, 
11 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 435, 435 (2013). 
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are subordinated for such a reason (the change in cash flow), other creditor loans 
should also be subordinated. Not to mention, under such treatment of loans, no one 
would loan money to companies.  
In short, it is suspicious that shareholder loans mislead potential creditors 
into providing loans to debtors, and the change in cash flow is not a problem unique 
to shareholder loans.  
 
5.2 The continuation of the business in insolvency 
 
German courts have pointed out repeatedly that shareholder loans enable 
companies to continue the business in insolvency. Thus, subordination of 
shareholder loans can be seen as a sanction against it. This can be understood 
relative to a director’s duty to file a petition for bankruptcy. In Germany, once a 
company becomes insolvent (overindebtedness or inability to pay debt), directors 
should file a petition for bankruptcy within three weeks ( § 15(a) 
Insolvenzordnung). 74  Nevertheless, if they decide to continue their business 
without filing a petition, they should be liable for the damages to creditors due to 
that decision (this liability is called Insolvenzverschleppungshaftung). 75  Thus, 
German law negatively evaluates “the continuation of the business in insolvency .” 
However, this reason is not persuasive under Japanese law. Unlike German 
law, Japanese law does not provide for such a director’s duty. Even if the director’s 
decision in insolvency is litigated, it would be settled through Art.429(1) of the 
Companies Act, which provides that “[if] Officers, Etc. are with knowledge or 
grossly negligent in performing their duties, such Officers, Etc. shall be liable to a 
third party for damages arising as a result thereof.”  This law is intended to allow 
creditors (third parties) to bring a direct action against directors for damages that 
they have suffered due to the directors’ gross negligence. Under this law, the 
decision to continue the business during financial difficulties is just one of the 
many factors Japanese courts consider when judging a director’s liability. 
Consequently, it is difficult to base subordination in Japan on such a duty.  
 
5.3 Undercapitalization 
 
Case law in the U.S. and some studies in Japan (for example, Egashira (1980), 
Katagi (1982), and Matsushita (1990)) focused on “undercapitalization.” Indeed, in 
some cases, subordination of shareholder loans has been employed where 
companies were undercapitalized or overly indebted. However, it is natural that 
                                                   
74 Derlef Kleindiek, Anh zu §64 Rn. 1., in GMBH-GESETZ KOMMENTAR (Lutter & Hommelhoff, 
ed., 2016) margin number 1.  
75 ANDRE TORSTEN WEIß, INSOLVENZSPEZIFISCHE GESCHÄFTSFÜHRERHAFTUNG 127 (2017). 
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companies find themselves in such a situation when their own assets are 
insufficient to pay all of their creditors. If companies have enough equity, creditors 
can collect on the loans in most cases. This was highlighted in In re Lifschultz Fast 
Freight:76  
 
Because mere undercapitalization does not, and should not, justify equitable 
subordination, we think the better view is that, while undercapitalization may 
indicate inequitable conduct, undercapitalization is not in itself inequitable 
conduct. 
. . . Every firm in bankruptcy, and many outside, can in some  sense be said to be 
undercapitalized--which is to say, to have insufficient funds on hand. 
. . . So what is wrong with undercapitalization in itself? 
 
In sum, if “undercapitalization” is used as a basis to subordinate shareholder 
loans to other creditors, subordination should be used whenever creditors cannot 
collect on all loans in bankruptcy proceedings. However, at best, 
“undercapitalization” may indicate some risk (excessive risk taking, etc.) arising 
from such a situation. Accordingly, we should pay attention not to 
undercapitalization itself, but to the concrete risks arising from 
undercapitalization.  
 
5.4 A simple remedy against exploitation  
 
How does subordination of shareholder loans work for exploitation? As mentioned 
above, in the recent studies in the U.S., subordination is understood as “a simple 
remedy against exploitation.”77 According to this view, it is difficult for creditors 
to prove the individual damages caused by exploitation because they must expend 
a great deal of time and resources to prove it. Dividends rules and fraudulent 
conveyance law do not handle exploitation well. In contrast, subordination does not 
require proof of specific damages from individual transactions or dividends, and it 
is enough to determine that a series of inequitable conduct by controlling 
shareholders amounts to exploitation. As a result, subordination contributes to a 
reduction of litigation costs and time, and thus functions as “a simple remedy 
against exploitation.”  
However, it is unnecessary to use subordination against exploitation to 
provide a remedy where the dividends rules and fraudulent conveyance law do not. 
First, if exploitation by controlling shareholders lasts for a long time, other general 
creditors are able to take self-defensive actions based on that fact. For example, 
                                                   
76 132 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 1997). 
77 CLARK, supra note 57, at 63. 
 19 
 
they may incorporate the exploitation in the terms of the contract between them 
and the companies (increasing the interest rate, etc.). If the exploitation is not 
continuous but rather a single act, Art. 424(1) of the Civil Code (the rescission of 
fraudulent act)78 is available in Japan, and requesting rescission is not costly. 
In addition, other creditors need not directly monitor the exploitation by 
controlling shareholders because it should be reflected in the companies’ financial 
statements. For example, if the controlling shareholders have the companies 
unreasonably discount trades between them and the companies, the companies’ 
profits would be reduced. The creditors can set the interest rates and terms based 
on the financial statements. If the exploitation has existed for a long time, creditors 
have enough time to respond to it. Accordingly, some self-defenses that are 
available to creditors may be more beneficial than subordination.  
 
5.5 Excessive risk taking 
 
As Gelter (2006) revealed, subordination of shareholder loans can control 
shareholders’ incentive to engage in excessive risk taking because subordination 
can internalize the damage resulting from such risk taking to shareholders by 
changing shareholder loans to equity.79  
Perhaps, German law may need to use subordination for excessive risk taking 
that is likely to be conducted during insolvency or near insolvency. Suppose that 
shareholders hold director positions, which is often the case in closely-held 
companies, and that they take on excessive risk without filing for bankruptcy. In 
such a case, under German law, creditors (or trustees) who challenge such practices 
must prove damages with accuracy (but the amount of their claims), as well as the 
point when directors should have filed for bankruptcy. Calculating damages is very 
difficult because creditors must calculate the repayments that would have been 
available in bankruptcy proceedings had the directors fulfilled their duties 
properly. This is a heavy burden for creditors, and thus this law is known as 
“Unused law (totes Recht).” 80  Accordingly, subordination may be a greater 
deterrent against excessive risk taking than this law. 
                                                   
78 Article 424(1) of the Civil Code provides as follows: 
 
An obligee may demand the court to rescind any juristic act which an obligor commits 
knowing that it will prejudice the obligee; provided, however, that, this shall not apply to 
the cases where any person who benefits from such act, or any person who succeeds to such 
benefit, did not know, at the time of such act or succession, the fact that the obligee is to 
be prejudiced. 
79 Gelter, supra note 70, at 487. 
80 Weiß, supra note 75, at 132. 
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In Japan, Art. 429(1) of the Companies Act can be used to pursue directors’ 
liability based on excessive risk taking. Unlike German law, Art. 429(1) is 
relatively useful for general creditors. It does not require creditors (third parties) 
to calculate their damages with accuracy and they can always demand the amount 
of their claims, and Japanese courts tend to easily recognize the gross negligence 
of directors in practice. 81  If shareholders are not in a director’s position, the 
corporate veil may be pierced to hold shareholders liable. It is similar to 
subordination in terms of function.  
Moreover, under both rules (Art. 429(1) of the Companies Act and piercing the 
corporate veil), the extent of compensated damages are not limited to the amount 
of shareholder claims.82 By contrast, subordination can cover only the amount of 
shareholder loans regardless of the amount of damages to creditors. Thus, even if 
subordination is used to deter excessive risk taking, there will be cases where 
subordination cannot prevent shareholders from taking excessive risk because 
subordination cannot internalize all of the externalized costs onto the 
shareholders.83  
 
5.6 Automatic subordination 
 
Should shareholder loans be automatically subordinated like under German law 
after 2008? There are some problems in this approach. 
If shareholder loans are always subordinated, it may discourage shareholders 
from bailing out companies with loans, even when the rescue attempt is efficient.84 
To avoid such a problem, it is more desirable to directly focus on the validity of the 
rescue attempt itself rather than shareholder loans.  
Perhaps, automatic subordination may be justified from the view that courts 
are not able to identify whether or not the rescue attempt with shareholder loans 
is efficient.85 As a result, courts could use shareholder loans as an alternative 
indicator of excessive risk taking. However, looking at the cases where 
subordination has been used in the U.S. and Germany, there is no indication that 
after shareholders make a loan to a company in crisis, the company engages in 
excessive risk taking. 86  Rather, there are many cases where companies in 
                                                   
81  Yoichi Takahashi, Torishimariyaku no Taidaisansha Sekinin ni kansuru Hanrei Hōri ha 
Kongo mo Iji sarerubekika? (2/Kan) [Should We Maintain the Case Law Rule about Directors' 
Liability to Third Parties? (2/final)] 178 - 2 HOGAKU RONSŌ 1, 13 (2015). 
82 Gelter, supra note 70, at 499. 
83 Id. at 487. 
84 Id. at 487. 
85  David A. Skeel & Georg Krause-Villmar, Recharacterization and the Nonhindrance of 
Creditors, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 259, 266 (2006) and Andreas Cahn, Equitable Subordination 
of Shareholder Loans?, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 287, 293 (2006). 
86 An exceptional case is Gannett Co. v. Larry, 221 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1955). 
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insolvency decide to continue business through shareholder loans. It is difficult to 
believe that after shareholder loans are made, shareholders (or directors) choose 
to take on excessive risk only in Japan. Thus, shareholder loans are inappropriate 
as alternative indicators of excessive risk taking.  
 
5.7 Involuntary (Tort) creditors  
 
In the above analysis, this paper assumed that creditors can engage in self-defense 
in the case of exploitation or excessive risk taking. However, some creditors cannot 
use self-defense, including tort creditors. Therefore, subordination of shareholder 
loans may be employed for them. 
However, the damages that tort creditors have suffered do not match the 
amount of subordinated claims. Accordingly, subordination cannot internalize tort 
costs into shareholders completely as it does in the cases of excessive risk taking 
In addition, from the viewpoint of compensation for damages, subordination is not 
a desirable approach. This is because subordination affects not only tort creditors, 
but also all creditors including voluntary creditors who can use self-defense. Thus, 
it is preferable for involuntary creditors to pursue a director’s liability to a third 
party (Art. 429(1) of the Companies Act) or pierce the corporate veil to directly 
obtain compensation. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
This paper argues that there is no need to actively use subordination of 
shareholder loans in Japan, as other laws (including self-defense by creditors) 
can better address the problems arising from a variety of situations that are 
revealed through comparative law. Instead, if we introduce subordination into 
Japanese law based on ambiguous reasons, it may hinder efficient rescue 
attempts or economic activities in closely-held companies or corporate groups.  
 
